MARIN COUNTY'S NEWS MONTHLY - FREE PRESS
(415)868-1600 -
(415)868-0502(fax) - P.O.
Box 31, Bolinas, CA, 94924
October, 2004
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The 9/11 Report, Part II:
Toto, I've A Feeling We're Not In Kansas Anymore.
By Stephen Simac
"Somewhere
over the rainbow, skies are blue
And the dreams that you dare to dream really do."
Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz-MGM 1939
The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was completed
in July after 18 months of investigation into 9/11. Their 500 plus page report
went through a newscycle or two in the media spin dryer before being discarded
like yesterday's news. That's at least one benefit of the Coastal Post being
a monthly rag. We can gnaw on this report like a dog on a ruby slipper. (see
last month's issue). This is part II of our in-depth analysis of the report.
Sales of the report published as a book are in the top ten on Amazon, so
Americans definitely want to know more about these findings. The mega media
hasn't paid much attention to it, considering this high level of interest.
They've left it to the free press.
The New York Times described a "largely, glowing reaction to the
September 11 Commission's final report." Most of the mega media and our
congress accepted the "no one to blame but them hijackers" (and maybe
Iran) conclusion of the commission.
After reading the book an informed public would vigorously disagree, but it is
a long, dense book written in a dry, "just the facts, ma'am" style,
limiting that audience.
The liberal media (except for Fox 'fairly unbalanced' news) was all over the
report's "no connection between Iraq
and 9/11" conclusion, which the bi-partisan Commission agreed on. Dick
Cheney pops up every now and then from his undisclosed location still claiming
this, as if he'd been hiding in a tornado shelter since the report came out.
It's working; half the public believes that Saddam was somehow connected
with 9/11, (although they couldn't tell you how).
Almost everyone has gotten behind the commission's recommendations on
reforming the intelligence community. The Republicans want to use it to ram
Patriot II Act down our throats, but not everyone is eager to go along on this
ride.
The Pentagon wants to protect their agencies from outside oversight, they
might accept an "intelligence czar" as long as he doesn't have any
say over their budgets.
Military intelligence "don't need no stinkin' reforms," just more
black budget funding. Bush's secretive neo-con cabal is not accountable and
prefers it that way. There is truly a "Cult of Intelligence" that
does not want any one looking behind the curtain.
"And in the name of the Lullaby League we wish to welcome you to
Munchkinland."
John Kerry is clinging to the Commission's trial balloon and wants to have
all 42 of their recommendations for reforming the 15 or more (known and
unknown) intelligence agencies passed. Senator Kerry, who served on the Senate
Intelligence Committee should know better.
It's hard to believe that the intelligence community can be reformed, much
less pruned. Take the massive new federal bureaucracy-the Homeland Security
Agency for an example. They're now in charge of airline security, along with a
thousand other oversight duties.
They were pulling Senator Edward Kennedy out of airplane queues because his
name came up as a possible terrorist. It took him a month to get off their no
fly list. (Not that the administration doesn't still consider him one.) Pity
some poor teacher's union rep who gets on this list.
The report the commission presented "to the president, the congress
and the people for their consideration" has landed with the thud of
"recommended reforms." No better kiss of death than that in a
government study. The report killed one wicked witch (nobody's fault but angry
Muslims) and has set off on the yellow brick road of intelligence reform. The
media and congress acted like grateful munchkins and waved so long, watch out
for those apple trees.
The most obvious failing of the bi-partisan commission was in not holding
anyone in government negligible or responsible for the abject failure to
protect American citizens. The commission found numerous documented warnings
that both the Clinton and Bush administration had
received well before 9/11 about al Quaeda terrorists planning to hijack
airplanes and attack within the US.
Part I of this analysis focused on failures to prevent the attacks based on
these warnings prior to 9/11. The evidence for serious charges of blatant
negligence by dozens of agencies and individuals was clearly laid out by the
commission. Yet the commissioners in unison laid the "principal blame
[on] a failure of imagination" and only chastised them. Not even a call
for resignations or demotions.
The commission showed the total lack of preparation and absolute failures to
act on these warnings by the intelligence community and other agencies. They
detailed the CIA/FBI joint task forces failed search for two of the hijackers
who'd been identified as al Qaeda terrorists before they entered the US, who'd lived with an FBI informant and attended
flight school in Arizona.
The commission assigned no blame for the dereliction of duty they
documented. To date only George Tenet has resigned from office over 9/11 and
he did it to "spend more time with his family." Always a good thing,
but why did he immediately travel to Europe without them after he resigned?
"I'm afraid you've made rather a bad enemy of the Wicked Witch of the
West. The sooner you get out of Oz altogether, the safer you'll sleep, my
dear." -Glinda, the Good Witch.
Part II analyzes the commission's findings on the events of that day. They
document failures to follow protocol, ineptness and delays due to lack of
preparation for responding to known threats and failures to communicate
critical information or follow up on it by individuals and agencies involved
that day. Again no single individual from any of these agencies was held
responsible or negligible.
The commission narrates the events of the day of the attacks beginning with
the known movements of the hijackers. (They found that at least 8 of the 19
men allowed to enter the country in the year before the attack had suspicious
visa irregularities. Only one possible al Quaeda hijacker had been turned away
by an immigration officer, the others sailed through as easily as they went
through security on 9/11.)
Four of the eight hijackers who flew out of Boston were flagged as security risks that morning but only their
baggage was held back until they entered the planes. Three of the five
hijackers who flew out of Washington's Dulles airport were selected for extra
scrutiny, because of their suspicious behavior, including one not having photo
ID or being able to answer the standard "baggage in your possession"
questions. Three set off the metal detectors, but were wanded by a security
guard of "marginal at best" competence, then cleared without finding
whatever had set off the alarm, against protocol. One of the hijackers at Newark was flagged and his baggage checked
for explosives. Some of them were flying without luggage and/or had paid in
cash. All were allowed to board their four planes in three different airports.
The first warning of a possible hijacking came at 8:14 am when Flight 11 out of Boston could not be contacted by his air traffic controller. At 8:21 its transponder was turned off. This is the transmitter of
a plane's location, altitude and speed to air traffic controllers. Radar can
be used to follow an aircraft without a transponder but a commercial airliner
turning theirs off is a serious indication that something is wrong.
At 8:19 am an AA reservation agent in South Carolina received an AT&T phone call
from one of the stewardesses on flight 11 that lasted about 25 minutes. Betty
Ong said "somebody's stabbed in business class and I think there's Mace...
we can't breathe, I think we're being hijacked."
She stayed on the line with the agent nearly until the plane crashed into
Tower One at 8:46 am. The agent alerted his supervisor,
who alerted the FAA at 8:29. Boston's FAA center already knew there was a problem by 8:25 because there had been a transmission from the cockpit,
"Nobody move, everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you'll
endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." possibly meant for
the passengers, but broadcast instead to the air traffic controller.
"If I only had a brain, I could while away the hours, conferrin' with
the flowers, consultin' with the Rain."-The Scarecrow.
The plane was described by Ong as flying erratically, The FAA knew it had
turned south and was flying up the Hudson corridor towards NY city. "Boston Center did not follow protocol in seeking
military assistance through the prescribed chain of command."
FAA agents involved finally reached and notified the military at 8:37. They got through to NEADS and said "we have problem
here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some
F-16's or something up there, help us out."
NEADS asked "is this real world, or exercise." He needed to ask
this. NORAD was holding at least 4 other exercises to practice defending
airspace that day, two of them in the Northeast area. The Commission does not
comment on the incredible synchronicity of the hijackers choosing the same day
for "real world." The NRO an intelligence agency was actually rehearsing
for a hijacked airline crashing into their building. The Pentagon had done a
similar rehearsal the year before.
Even with all these exercises, or perhaps because of them response was
incredibly slow. Not until 8:53 were any
interceptor military jets launched but neither pilots nor NEAD knew where their
target was, which had just crashed into a Twin
Tower. Instead the pilots were ordered
into a holding pattern off of Long Island
until 9:13.
This pattern of slow reaction to and poor communication of alarming
information about hijackings, their location and direction, and even their
crashes by the airlines, the FAA and the military chain of command was
repeated throughout the morning with the other three flights. "That nine
minutes notice before impact was the most the military was to have all
day."
The delays in notification and reactions of administration officials were
similarly scrambled. Although the Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld team's spin was that
they "reacted in the time it takes for a batter to decide to swing,"
the commission's report shows otherwise. Bush famously sat in that Sarasota classroom enjoying a children's
story for ten minutes after being notified that a second plane had hit the Twin Towers at 9:05. "He felt should project strength and calm until he
could better understand what was happening."
The school was a possible target for a hijacked plane or other terrorist
attack. It was a publicly scheduled appearance by Bush, and he made a
nationally televised speech from the school. The Secret Service said they
"were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think
it imperative for him to run out the door." Impact was the most the
military would receive of any of the four hijackings."
Instead of evacuating the school and hustling him out to an armor plated
limousine, the entourage remained at the school until 9:35 while the "focus was on the President's statement to
the nation".
The scene in Washington was not as "calm." Cheney
began a video conference call at 9:25,
and was evacuated from the White House at 9:37
after the Pentagon was struck. He continued with this teleconference in the
underground shelter.
"Emerald City? Why, that's a long and dangerous journey. And it might
rain on the way."-The Tinman
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who was actually "second in command"
for the military response, was "still trying to be located" by
staff for this call at 9:44. He did not join the call until
some time after 10:30. Rumsfeld had been having breakfast
with some members of congress, then went to his office for his daily
intelligence briefing in his office.
He was informed of the second strike during that meeting, but continued with
the briefing until the Pentagon was hit. Rummy then "went to the parking
lot to assist with rescue efforts."
Legally he was the person the president was to give "shoot down"
orders for interceptor jets, but Cheney took over this role since the
Secretary of Defense was out of touch.
It wouldn't have mattered. Those orders were given by Bush to Cheney shortly
after 10:10 after Cheney directed the president
to not fly back to Washington because of the danger. That order
was relayed repeatedly by Cheney's aide after 10:14 to NORAD. General Arnold officially passed on the shoot down orders at
10:31 by instant messaging, but that order wasn't passed on to the pilots
because "they were unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with this
guidance." NORAD's fighter jets scrambled from nearby Langley base flew out over the ocean for a
hundred miles because they didn't know what or where they were defending
against.
All hijacked planes had been crashed since Flight 93 went down in a field
near Gettysburg at 10:03. The tape from that flight indicates that the hijackers
decided to crash the plane after passengers began trying to break into the
cockpit. Passengers were heard to say "roll it", (not Let's Roll!)
possibly referring to a service cart they were trying to use as a battering
ram.
"I'll fight you both together if you want! I'll fight you with one paw
tied behind my back. I'll fight you standing on one foot."-The Lion
Washington was still receiving reports of
ghost planes approaching the Capitol, but only had interceptor jets with pilots
flying "weapons free" after 10:14.
This was only because General Wherley of the Air National Guard out of Andrews
base gave his pilots that order, allowing them to make the choice whether to
shoot down any aircraft over the capitol. He had called the vice president's
Secret Service agent directly, bypassing NORAD. The only radar warning aircraft
that could have gotten shot down turned out to be a medevac helicopter.
Senior officials at the FAA were totally out of the picture during most of
this time. NORAD and NEAD were stumbling around. The response of everyone
involved was incompetent at best. The report never blames anyone, but their
narrative makes it clear that heads should be rolling.
This report might satisfy the media and congress, but it will never satisfy
the informed public. A recent Zogby polled found that half of New Yorkers
believe the government knew of the attacks and allowed them to happen.
Two-thirds want another investigation to find out the truth about this. This
report will not satisfy them.
The 9/11 commission, more accurately their staff, has compiled an enormous
amount of information. Commission members unanimously agreed on a not
unreadable narrative although there is no index and most footnoted documents
can not be referred to by researchers. Timelines are compartmentalized
obscuring a clear picture of how badly things were handled.
"As for you my fine friend, you're the victim of disorganized thinking.
You are under the unfortunate delusion that simply because you run away from
danger you have no courageÉTherefore for meritorious conduct, extraordinary
valor, conspicuous bravery against wicked witches, I award you the Triple
Cross." -The Wizard of Oz.
It's still quite clear. When the report was presented to the Senate
Government Affairs Committee, Senator Dayton thanked the commission and staff
for documenting "the utter failure to defend [American citizens] by their
federal government, by their leaders and the institutions that were entrusted
to do soÉthe repeated and catastrophic failures of the leaders of the leaders
in charge and the other people responsible to do their jobsÉ and because of
serious discrepancies between the facts that you've set forth and what was told
to the American people, to members of Congress and to your own Commission by
some of those authorities."
He emphasized their failures "to follow established procedures. To
follow direct orders from civilian and military commanders. And then they
failed to tell us the truth later. This is just unbelievable negligence. It
doesn't matter if we spend $550 billion annually on our national defense, if we
reorganize our intelligence or if we restructure congressional oversight."
A group of 25 former counterintelligence and counterterrorism employees of
the FBI, CIA, FAA, Customs and the DIA held a press conference to blast the
report in September. They said the commission's report "deliberately
ignores official and civil servants who were and still are clearly negligent
and or derelict in their duties to the nation. If these individuals are
protected rather than held accountable, the mindset that enabled 9-11 will
persistÉ no matter how much money is poured into the agencies. Only a
commission bent on holding no one responsible and reaching unanimity could have
missed that. "
One could say the same for the mega media and congress that accepts this.