Some facts related to the Black Box Voting issue are easily proven. It is now understood that at least twenty percent of all voting machines in the United States will NOT provide any type of paper trail. So when the November election rolls around, these machines will not offer any means to establish and verify the original vote, and there will be no way to ensure that the vote was not tampered with.

I know less than I'd like to. The 500 documents that I have examined pale in comparison to the remaining 15,000 pages of documents. The documents relate the unimaginable. (Google the terms: Bev Harris plus black box voting.) My traveling to the recent state hearings added to the horror. Witnesses at the Sacramento hearings, April 20th and 21st, conducted by a panel under Kevin Shelley, Secretary of State, testified to an array of suspicious findings. These included an accounting of how Alameda County experienced problems with voting machinery at over one third of their polling places in the March 2nd, 2004 Primary. At another county, over 2,000 votes intended for John Kerry went to Dick Gephardt instead.

It is established fact that the major computer companies contracted by government to provide us with election results are guilty of ominous and reprehensible practices. One witness asked that the audience try to imagine a security firm telling a bank: Look, we'll provide a safe and secure system for your bank vault and all the money. But we ask that we can keep the vault's combination lock, so that we can periodically come in and play with the money. But please don't worry: we promise not to take any of the stacks of loot.

Incredible as it may sound, that analogy describes the behavior of Diebold in its involvement with county election machinery. Diebold and other firms like Diebold, (notably Sequoia Pacific,) have been contracted by individual counties to provide electronic voting machinery. The firm created a "backdoor" inside its computer coding that involved the password "1111", allowing its employees access to the inner tabulations of the software. Observers to the Mar 2nd Primary, stationed at polls across the state, saw Diebold employees working at keyboards inside the central county election office in several counties during the evening hours. One such county, Riverside, ended up with a contested decision. The eventual winner received the exact number of votes that Riverside County requires for a win.

Just as scary is this true tale: industry has already wooed the very individuals that are in charge of the security of our voting processes. As it became apparent over the last several years that there were problems with Diebold, local governments began to hire investigators. In one instance last fall, the investigator found a serious glitch within the system. However, rather than reporting his findings to the government, he went to Diebold. It is not known what the terms involving possible future employment that Diebold offered the man. But in situations like this, the offers are being made. And why would anyone work for the county, when you can make more money working for Diebold?

Of course, there are things under Diebold that you would have to live with. Take the icon for Global Election Systems (A Diebold Company Division). The icon is a totalitarian-styled fist that clutches a globe in rather greedy fashion. Its bright colors suggest eye candy, but the message is sinister.

As well it should be. Diebold is not some anomaly. Rather it is a carefully created corporate structure. Among its owners and lead employees are convicted felons. The company is closely tied in, hand in hand, with right wing interests. In fact, when you examine the situation that our state has been placed in, and compare us with the state of Iowa, questions arise.

After the debacle of the 2000 election, a federal initiative to provide safer voting systems for all Americans came to the forefront. All fifty states began the process of re-evaluating and re-legislating the systems under which elections and voting machinery would be accountable.

In the state of Iowa, which held a Democratic governor and Secretary of State, this legislation insisted on a verifiable paper trail, to be in place for each ballot cast. Our state, under a Republican Secretary of State, required only that election machinery be upgraded. Why ever demand paper? After all, the argument went, paper is so old-fashioned and we could have machines that are fully electronic. Under an electronic system, the hanging chad problem would dissolve. And with companies like Diebold stating that to add a paper trail would cost at least a thousand dollars per voting machine, (although critics believe the cost could be far less, in the range of $150) the legislature was massaged into accepting this foolish paperless voting strategy.

The legislators in the Capital Mall in Sacramento were happy. So were county election officials. (Whether the industry/government revolving door scenario accounts for some of this happiness or not would be sheer speculation. But do consider the possibility.) Only one individual was tormented by this state of affairs. Her name is Bev Harris. She took upon herself the impossible task of sorting through the entire situation. Certain facts jumped out at her. How could it be that serving on the Board of Directors at Global Elections Systems was none other than Jeffrey Dean, a convicted felon whose past included a major computer-aided embezzlement charge? How could it be that no paper trail was being required? Among the most astounding events of all, Harris uncovered the open source code for the Diebold system on the Web one day while playing around with Google! She downloaded the code. Yet industry still insisted that the system was secure. Officials in California were satisfied to overlook such a scandalous item. And on the surface, voters themselves seemed apathetic.

Harris doesn't believe that they are apathetic. "People are good-natured. The biggest obstacle that I encounter in taking my message about voting systems forward is that the public cannot believe that their trust has been violated." Harris has published "Black Box Voting" a book that is becoming exceedingly popular. Also becoming popular is her notion that a cadre of 2,004 voters are needed to volunteer to oversee the November elections. The only problem she has had in setting up this organization is in being swamped with people wanting to help. She now says that she has upped the ante and is now requiring 20,004 volunteers. She doesn't see any problem in arriving at that figure.

Yet her initial skeptical question remains: How could it be that industry and officials were so friendly?

When voters in California's November 2002 election chose Kevin Shelley (Dem) to take over as Secretary of State, he began the process of shoring up election security. Largely because of activists bringing major concerns to the forefront, hearings were held throughout 2003. On Feb. 5, 2004 California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley directed counties to tighten up security procedures. For some activists, his directives did not go far enough. They felt that identified and gaping holes in security were left unresolved. But his increased security measures were an extremely important beginning. However, 10 counties revolted against his authority and, unbelievably, protested against following even these minimal security procedures. County elections officials from 10 counties signed a letter stating their intent to fight the improved security measures. Riverside County also issued an additional letter stating its opposition to the voting security methods directed by Shelley.

It has been suggested by some activists that it is not only the revolving door possibilities that influence officialdom. The Diebold system can allow any county officials that really want to have full access to creating the election results that they choose. Why rely on the pesky whims of the electorate, when you, as an already established County presence, can see that your people fill any and all local positions? As power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, a scenario wherein a County Board of Supervisor can hand choose the major players to come into office during his or her term, and THEN receive an industry job with Diebold, after the government career is over, whatever more could a mere mortal ask?

Indeed, at the hearings, a Riverside County Supervisor attested to the total satisfaction that he felt with having Diebold in place. He offered that the recent election had come off without a hitch (not true, the election was contested.) He said that the vote was counted with 100% accuracy. But under the Diebold system, we simply have no way of determining that. None, nada! We do know that one of the Diebold employees seen feverishly typing into a keyboard inside county election office did have the presence of mind to put a jacket over his Diebold coat when he was noticed by an election observer. And the winner received the exact number of votes needed to win.

Here in Marin, voters are provided with Diebold's optical scan system. Among other upsetting features of local elections is that no longer is the voter given a private booth that is screened off. Where I vote in Sausalito, any of the election judges can and do walk around behind me while I vote. If their eyesight is good, they can see to whom I am giving my vote. Jim March, who is probably second only to Bev Harris in terms of activism on this issue, explained to me that this opti-scan system can be readily hacked. However, as there is a paper trail, should the decision come about to cheat the electorate, the wise way to proceed in cheating would be to hack the vote with a large enough percentage to discourage the opposition from seeking a recount. (Typically recounts come about when there is only a minor difference in the number of ballots cast between opponents.) So safe cheating involves merely doing it on a larger scale than a smaller scale. Since one is as easy as the other, why not?

At the end of the hearings, on Thursday, April 22nd, Shelley's Voting Systems and Procedures Panel unanimously decided to pass hard-hitting recommendations that electronic voting systems be de-certified. Furthermore, the panel provided recommendations that tampering, altering or even having access to the voting and election systems inner workings should be considered a felony. Apparently, the panel was not pleased with the image of Diebold employees involved in some type of activity within the election offices on election night.

It now remains for Shelley to approve their findings. He has ten days to do so. If the machinery is not officially de-certified by Shelley within those ten days, state law allows for Diebold and other firms to continue with their contracts, as they have been allowed a six month leeway agreement in the former legislation. (May 2nd to November 2nd entails this six month period.) It is a difficult decision. Should he go ahead and sign the panel's recommendations, lawsuits from both the Asian language community, and from the disabled community, will proceed against the state. There is also the entire question of just how the local governments will arrive at replacing the machinery. At whose expense? And with what?

One complication is that beyond whatever the state does (and apparently the state of California desires working things out in a timely fashion with an eye to the November election,) the Federal government must also be willing to certify the system deemed necessary for these changes. Until this week, Shelley did not believe that such Federal certification would occur before July 2005. If the Feds drag their feet on this, it offers them the advantage of delivering the vote in November to George W. It remains to be seen that they would speed up a process that might ensure that the vote go to his opponent, John Kerry. (As I type this sentence, recent California polls show that Bush is slipping ever farther behind in voter satisfaction. He does not seem to be the preferred candidate among us.)

Regarding the larger election and voting machine issue, Sen. Hillary Clinton is tackling the voting security issue. The Senator has said, "When you go to an ATM, you get a receipt. You play the lottery, you get a ticket. Yet when you cast your vote, you get nothing." It seems that it is a no-brainer, that we have a verifiable paper trail. Regardless of your party affiliation, if you value democracy, please call upon our California Senators to remain proactive in this important matter. (Boxer's phone is 415-403-0100, Feinstein's phone is 415-393-0707. Feinstein has a related bill, Senate Bill 1980.)